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Recent Decisions
Administrative Law - State Courts Have No Power To
Review Rent Schedules Fixed By F.H.A. Administrator
Under National Housing Act. Fieger v. Glen Oaks Village,
132 N. E. 2d 492, 309 N. Y. 527 (1956). Plaintiffs, tenants in
F.H.A.-insured housing project, sued landlords in state
court to recover allegedly excessive rent, maintaining that
defendants, by fraud in overestimating construction costs,
procured excessive mortgage insurance from F.H.A. with
the result that the rent schedules set under the Housing
Act, 12 U. S. C. A. §1743 (1945 ed. and 1955 Supp.), were
greatly in excess of reasonable rentals. On appeal from
dismissal for want of jurisdiction, held, affirmed. (1) The
determination of F.H.A. authorities represents federal gov-
ernmental action by authorized federal officers, and state
courts have no power to revise or review such official acts;
(2) In New York, a tenant claiming to be deprived of rights
under rent laws by fraudulent misrepresentations made
to government authorities has no remedy unless a specific
statute gives him such; (3) Plaintiffs were not third party
beneficiaries under the doctrine of Laurence v. Fox, 20
N. Y. 268 (1859).
Under the National Housing Act, 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1702
(1945 ed. and 1955 Supp.), and the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1009 (1950 ed.), there would
seem to be a suggestion that the Federal Housing Commis-
sioner's rent schedules might be reviewed by state courts
exercising jurisdiction concurrcnt vith federal ccurts.
However, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. A.
Sec. 1001 (1950 ed.), excepts administrative acts made pur-
suant to Sec. 1743 from its operation and, thus a review was
denied in Choy v. Farragut Gardens, 131 F. Supp. 609 (S. D.
N. Y. 1955).
Constitutional Law - Statute Providing For Automatic
Dismissal Of City Employee Who Invokes Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination Is Void As A Violation Of Due Process.
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of City of N.Y., 76
S. Ct. 637 (1956). Appellant, a teacher at city-operated Brook-
lyn College, invoked the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination when asked by the Senate Internal Secur-
ity Subcommittee whether he had been a Communist Party
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member prior to 1941. He was summarily dismissed under
§903 of the New York City Charter, providing for the auto-
matic termination of employment of any city employee
making use of the privilege. On appeal from an affirmance
of the dismissal by the New York Court of Appeals, held
(5-4), reversed. Since from invocation of the privilege
neither guilt of the conduct inquired into nor perjury for
false invocation of the privilege can be inferred, such in-
vocation has no reasonable relation, of itself, to appellant's
fitness to hold his job; to summarily terminate that job on
the sole basis of such invocation, without inquiring into the
circumstances, shows a denial of "'protection of the in-
dividual against arbitrary action' which Mr. Justice Car-
dozo characterized as the very essence of due process"
(641). Mr. Justice Reed dissented: on the ground that the
city may require an employee as a condition of employ-
ment either to give information pertinent to official in-
quiries or to give up his job. The privilege protects one
against prosecution, not against loss of job. "A denial of
due process is 'a practice repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.' Surely no such situation exists here." (Dis. op.,
642, 643.)
In Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U. S. 716 (1951),
the Court upheld the right of Los Angeles to require an
affidavit stating whether the applicant had ever been a
Communist Party member and, if so, full particulars there-
of, as a pre-requisite to continued or prospective employ-
ment, such membership being possible grounds for dis-
missal. But this case is distinguishable from the present
one in that refusal to make the affidavit can lead to an in-
ference of guilt without running afoul of any specific con-
stitutional guaranties. Adler v. Board of Education, 342
U. S. 485 (1952), upheld the Feinberg Law, but the ma-
chinery for dismissal on grounds of membership in a sub-
versive organization provided for a hearing, with right to
counsel and judicial review. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U. S. 183 (1952), the Court decided negatively the ques-
tion whether due process permits a state to bar one from
its employ purely on the basis of membership, innocent or
otherwise, in groups dubbed "subversive" by the United
States Attorney General. Due process was said to proscribe
guilt by association. Ullmann v. United States, 76 S. Ct. 497
(1956), indicated that a majority of the Court will not
broaden the interpretation of the self-incrimination privi-
lege to include anything more than protection against actual
prosecution. A consideration of these decisions, cited by
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the justices as relevant authority, and of the sharp division
of the Court on the proper limits to the scope of due process,
leads to a conclusion that the present case, in oracular
fashion, raises a question by answering one, i.e., it being
decided that a governmental employee is at least entitled to
a hearing before dismissal for assertion of the self-incrimi-
nation privilege, then if, after a hearing, such employee is
removed on the sole ground of his use of the privilege, has
the due process clause been violated?
Corporations - General Manager Has Implied Power
To Bind Corporation To Charitable Gifts. Memorial Hos-
pital Ass'n. v. Pacific Grape Products Co., 290 P. 2d 481
(Cal. 1955). Plaintiff, a non-profit hospital association which
had been soliciting construction funds, brought this action
to recover against defendant corporation $5,000, pledged
in writing by Triplett, president, general manager, and
owner of 73% of the stock of defendant. The board of
directors, which evidently convened only at Triplett's call,
had never been consulted on the matter, though it had
acquiesed for many years in small contributions made by
Triplett to the Community Chest. On appeal from judg-
ment for plaintiff, held affirmed. A general manager has
greater powers than the president and pursuant to his
authority to conduct the business, he has implied power to
bind the corporation to any act appropriate to the ordinary
course of business. Reasonable charitable gifts are within
this course of business and the differential between the size
of the gift and that of former donations does not make it
unreasonable. A local hospital could be a benefit to the
corporation not only for good will but as a ready haven for
its employees.
Penowa Coal Sales Co. v. Gibbs & Co., 199 Md. 114, 119,
85 A. 2d 464 (1952), stated that a general manager has au-
thority to do any act which is usual and necessary in the
ordinary course of its business, and may exercise all the
powers which the board of directors could exercise or au-
thorize under the same circumstances. Md. Code (1951)
Art. 23, Sec. 9 (10), permits boards of directors to authorize
charitable gifts if reasonable, and the concept of "reason-
ableness" has been steadily expanding in American law.
Damages - Award Of $750 For Slight Illness Resulting
From Consumption Of Contaminated Soft Drink Held
Excessive. Leathers v. Sikeston Coca-Cola Bottling Com-
pany, 286 S. W. 2d 393 (Mo. App. 1956). The plaintiff con-
19561
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sumed a substantial portion of soft drink bottled by the
defendant company before she noticed a photograph film
in the bottle. She became nervous, and suffered headaches;
upon the advice of her physician, she drank milk exclu-
sively and in large quantities for the following six days.
Six months later she broke out in a rash of pimples. On
appeal from judgment for the plaintiff for $750, held,
affirmed upon condition of remittitur of $500. The plaintiff
lost no wages, showed no medical expense, suffered no
lasting effects, and failed to establish a causal connection
between the event and nervous symptoms. An award of the
sum of $250 would be fair.
For cases involving impurities in beverages see 47
A. L. R. 153 and 88 A. L. R. 532.
Elections - When Voting Machines Are Mandatory,
Failure To Use Them Invalidates The Election. Isgitt v.
Jackson, 85 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 1956). Plaintiff was de-
feated in a municipal election in which voting machines
were not used. A statute provided that such machines were
to be used "throughout the entire state of Louisana in all
elections provided by law" (291). Plaintiff sought a judg-
ment declaring the election null and void. Defendant's de-
,murrer was sustained. On appeal, held, reversed. Failure
to use voting machines as required by law necessarily in-
volves the absolute nullity of the election.
In Maryland, beginning with the 1956 general election,
use of voting machines in all elections is mandatory. Md.
Code Supp. (1955) Art. 33, Sec. 92(g). Protection of the
voter's free choice was the principal concern of the Court
of Appeals in Wilkinson v. McGill, 192 Md. 387, 393, 395,
64 A. 2d 266 (1949).
"... when an election has been held and it is not
shown that the failure of the officials to observe the
requirements of the law has interfered with the fair
expression of the will of the voters, courts have gener-
ally held that the result of the election will not be
disturbed.
"These principles do not apply to a situation where
there is a preemptory requirement designed to safe-
guard the integrity of elections, the neglect of which
presents an apparent opportunity for fraud."
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Evidence - State Cannot Call Defendant's Wife To
Stand Where Wife Is Incompetent To Testify Against
Husband. Caldwell v. State, 287 S. W. 2d 176 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1956). Defendant was convicted of statutory rape of
his stepdaughter. Defendant's wife's sister, who lived with
defendant's family, testified that she had never seen any
improper conduct of defendant toward his stepdaughter,
and in testimony frequently referred to defendant's wife
by name. On rebuttal, the state called defendant's wife to
the witness stand, whereupon defendant objected to her
testimony on the grounds that she as wife of defendant was
incompetent to testify. By statute in Texas, a husband or
wife are incompetent to testify against one another in all
criminal actions except in a criminal offense committed by
one against the other. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (1944), Tit. 8,
Art. 714, 2 Vernon's Texas Stat. (1948), p. 433. On appeal,
held, reversed and remanded. Forcing defendant to object
to his wife's testimony gave rise to the inference that she
could have refuted her sister's testimony if permitted to
testify. Allowing the tender of this witness permitted the
state to prove indirectly what it is prohibited from doing
directly.
This case is in accord with the usual view that where a
husband and wife are incompetent to testify against each
other, it is inconsistent with the full exercise of the privi-
lege of exclusion of a spouse's testimony for a court to
allow an unfavorable inference to be drawn against the de-
fendant by his objection to proposed testimony of his spouse
called to the stand by the state. See 8 WimoiRE, EViDENCE
(3rd ed. 1940) Sec. 2243.
This problem would not arise in Maryland since the
witness-spouse is competent to testify against the other
(Md. Code (1951) Art. 35, Sec. 4); the privilege not to
testify is extended to the witness-spouse only, and the de-
fendant cannot object to proposed testimony of his spouse
if she chooses to testify against him. Raymond v. State ex
rel. Younkins, 195 Md. 126, 72 A. 2d 711 (1950). As to
whether one spouse can be compelled to testify against the
other, see Moser, Compellability of One Spouse to Testify
Against the Other in Criminal Cases, 15 Md. L. Rev. 16
(1955).
Insurance - Refusal Of Insurer To Tender Return Of
Premium After Knowledge Of Breach Waives The Defense.
Connecticut Fire Insurance Company v. Johnson, 293 P. 2d
607 (Okl. 1955). Plaintiff brought action against defendant
insurer on an automobile collision policy, maintaining that
19561
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defendant's refusal to tender a return of the premium
amounted to a waiver of all defenses. Defendant claimed
that the policy was void for by material and fraudulent
misrepresentation in that plaintiff, representing himself as
an electrical contractor was in fact a bootlegger, and that it
was not obliged to return the premium until it had final
judgment entered in its favor. On appeal from a judgment
entered on the pleadings for plaintiff, held, affirmed. Re-
fusal to tender return of the unearned premium was in-
consistent with an intent, expressed in the pleadings, to
void the policy, and amounted to a waiver of defense. The
fact that defendant insurer did not know of the fraudulent
misrepresentation until after the loss had occurred is im-
material.
As a general rule, the retention of unearned premiums
by the insurer does not amount to waiver or estoppel when
the insurer was without knowledge of the breach until after
the loss. 16 APPLEToN, INSURANCE (1944) Sec. 9303; 45
C. J. S. 693, Insurance, Sec. 716. See Automobile Insurance
Exchange v. Wilson, 144 Md. 249, 255, 124 A. 876 (1923);
Stiegler v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 146 Md. 629, 127 A. 397
(1925).
Motor Vehicles - Nonresident Motorist Statute Held
Not Applicable To Accidents On Private Property. Langley
v. Bunn, 284 S. W. 2d 319 (Ark. 1955). This was an action
by a filling station attendant who sustained injuries while
servicing the car of defendant, a nonresident motorist.
An order sustaining the defendant's motion to quash ser-
vice of process, held, affirmed. Substituted service under
the Nonresident Motorist statute does not extend to actions
arising out of accidents on private property involving the
nonresident's automobile.
The Maryland Nonresident Motorist statute until 1956,
was substantially the same as the one construed by the
Arkansas court. Md. Code (1951) Art. 66/2, Sec. 113, pro-
vided that a nonresident using the roads and highways of
Maryland appoints by law the Secretary of State his lawful
attorney, upon whom may be served processes in an action
"growing out of any accident in which the nonresident may
be involved while operating... a motor vehicle on such
public highway". (Emphasis supplied.) Rilling v. Jones,
130 F. Supp. 834 (Md. 1955) quashed process against de-
fendant nonresident motorist in an action arising out of a
collision on a private road, saying that the Maryland legis-
lature did not intend to apply the statute to accidents
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occurring on private roads and driveways. However, by
Chapter 83 of the Laws of 1956, the Legislature amended
subsection (a) of Sec. 113 of Article 66 , by adding after
the words "public highway", the following:
".... or elsewhere within the boundaries of the State
of Maryland, including but not limited to property
owned by individuals, firms, corporation or the Federal
government: ... "
Statutes of other states also provide for substituted ser-
vice from accidents involving nonresident motorists with-
in the state. Purdon's Pa. Stat. Tit. 75, Sec. 1201 (1936);
Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2703.20 (1953). The New York legis-
lature amended its statute by substituting the words "in
this state" for the words "on such a public highway". N. Y.
Vehicle and Traffic Law, Sec. 52 (1952).
Workman's Compensation - Murder Of Watchman
Getting Coffee Off The Premises Arose Out Of His Employ-
ment. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Company v.
Croft, 91 S. E. 2d 110 (Ga. App. 1955). Plaintiff's husband,
a night watchman who had been granted permission by his
employer to make coffee at a certain place on the premises,
was murdered over a cup of coffee in a "drive-in" located
100 yards from the premises, apparently by someone try-
ing to rob the "drive-in". Plaintiff filed a claim under the
Workman's Compensation Act. On appeal from a judgment
for plaintiff, held, affirmed. To be compensable under the
Act, injuries must have been sustained within the course of
employment, and must, as a matter of causation, have arisen
out of that employment. (1) Personal acts of an employee
such as quenching thirst, eating, protecting himself from
the elements, etc., which are reasonably necessary for his
health and comfort are incidents within the scope of his
employment. Temporary inattention of a night watchman
is to be expected and does not amount to an abandonment
of his employment. (2) Since a common hazard of a night
watchman's work is that he will be set upon by robbers,
the murder arose out of his employment and was not the
result of a third party act involving matters disassociated
with his work. Felton, J., dissented: the fact that plaintiff's
decedent was a night watchman was not a legal cause of
his demise; even if it were, he absented himself from his
employer's premises to such a degree as to have effected a
temporary abandonment of his employment.
Maryland determination of the causation prerequisite to
recovery - that the injury "arise out of" the employment
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(Md. Code (1951) Art. 101, Sec. 14) - has opened and
closed like an erratic bellows. The consistent lack of dis-
coverable pattern to the cases leads to the necessary con-
clusion that each case, as it comes up on its facts, is, for all
practical purposes, one of first impression. See Perdue v.
Brittingham, 186 Md. 393, 401, 47 A. 2d 491 (1946) ; compare
Schemmel v. T. B. Gatch & Sons Co., 164 Md. 671, 683, 166
A. 39 (1933), ("The causative danger must be peculiar to
the work and not common to the neighborhood.") To
Watson v. Grimm, 200 Md. 461, 465, 90 A. 2d 180 (1952),
("An injury to an employee arises out of his employment
when it results from some obligation, condition or incident
of the employment."); but contrast to these cases and to
each other Atlantic Refining Co. v. Forrester, 180 Md. 517,
523, 25 A. 2d 667 (1942), and Rumple v. Henry H. Meyer
Company, 118 A. 2d 486 (Md., 1955). In Maryland's "night
watchman" case, it was decided that the employee's murder,
for reasons unrelated to his work, might be found by a jury
to have arisen out of his employment, for that the job brings
extra exposure to danger, from personal as well as pro-
fessional enemies. Todd v. Easton Furniture Co., 147 Md.
352, 128 A. 42 (1925).
Wrongful Death - Statute Does Not Permit Minor To
Sue Father For Death Of Mother. Durham v. Durham,
85 So. 2d 807 (Miss. 1956). The mother of plaintiff minor
child was killed while riding in an automobile negligently
operated by her husband, defendant herein. The child sued
her father under the Wrongful Death statute. On appeal
from an order sustaining defendant's demurrer, held,
affirmed. Though the beneficiary under the act cannot
bring an action which the deceased could not have brought
had she lived, the relationship of wife and husband between
deceased and defendant does not bar this action. However,
there being no express assertion in the act of legislative in-
tent to abrogate the common law rule barring a minor from
suing his parent in tort, such rule does preclude this action.
The rise of family automobile accidents in recent years,
and the possibility illustrated by this case that either the
rule against wife suing husband, Furstenberg v. Fursten-
berg, 152 Md. 247, 253, 136 A. 534 (1927), or that against
child suing parent, Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.
2d 923 (1951), noted, 12 Md. L. Rev. 202 (1951), may be
used to prevent any relief against the tort-feasor, make
this problem a serious one, which Md. Code (1951) Art. 67,
Sec. 1, essentially the same as the Mississippi statute, does
not solve.
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